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WILLS-The Receipt of Substantial Benefits Under 
a Will by One in Confidential Relationship 
With Testator Raises a Presumption of Undue 
Influence Which Mter Rebutting Evidence Is 
Introduced Remains as a Permissible Inference 
for the Jury-In re Wood Estate* 
223 
Testator bequeathed to proponent, his private secretary, a sub-
stantial portion of his estate.1 Contestant, testator's niece and sole 
heir, attacked the validity of the bequest on the grounds of propo-
nent's alleged undue influence, and introduced evidence indicating 
the existence of a confidential relationship between proponent and 
testator. Proponent denied both the existence of a confidential rela-
tionship and the allegations of undue influence, and introduced evi-
dence that independent counsel had advised testator in the making 
of his will. The trial court granted proponent's motion for a di-
rected verdict.2 On appeal, heldJ reversed, two justices dissenting. 
The receipt of substantial benefits under a will by one in a confi-
dential relationship with testator raises a presumption of undue 
influence which remains as a permissible inference for the jury even 
after rebutting evidence has been introduced. 
The operation of any presumption raises two related questions: 
first, what basic facts must be shown before the presumption arises, 
and second, what is the status of the presumption once rebutting 
evidence has been introduced. With respect to the presumption of 
undue influence, courts have given widely varying answers to these 
questions.8 Disagreement as to the first stems from the significance 
attributed to a confidential or fiduciary relationship between testa-
tor and beneficiary. In several jurisdictions the confidential relation-
ship alone is sufficient to raise the presumption of undue influence,4 
• In re Wood Estate, 374 Mich. 278, 132 N.W.2d 35 (1965), 5 A.L.R.3d 1 (1966) 
[hereinafter cited as principal case]. 
1. In 1956 testator executed a will which left the residue of his estate to the co-
trustees of a previously created inter vivos trust, the National .Banlc of Detroit and 
May Flemming, his private secretary. According to the terms of the trust, the co-trustees 
were to pay contestant $300 per month, May Flemming .$150 per month and Maud 
Wilkins, testator's housekeeper, $65 per month. These distributions were to begin 
after testator's death. On January 5, 1959, the trust was amended so as to increase 
Miss Flemming's share to $300 per month. On August 26, 1959, testator executed a 
codicil to the 1956 will, incorporating the amendments to the trust agreement. Testator 
died January 6, 1960 at the age of 91. 
2, The trial court's reasoning was apparently that no fiduciary or confidential 
relationship had been established so that no presumption arose and, even if such a 
relationship had been shown, the resulting presumption of undue influence would have 
been completely rebutted by the evidence of independent counsel. Brief for Appellant, 
app. at 217a-23a. 
3, See ATKINSON, WILIS § 101, at 550-52 (2d ed. 1953). 
4. See, e.g., .Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 147 Conn. 474, 162 A.2d 709 (1960); In the 
Matter of the Estate of Swan, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P-2d 682 (1956). However, the mean-
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while the vast majority of states require some additional evidence-
most commonly evidence that the beneficiary procured or partici-
pated actively in the execution of the questioned will-before the 
presumption may be invoked.5 With respect to the second question, 
once credible rebutting evidence-such as evidence that testator 
consulted independent counsel in preparing his will-has been in-
troduced by proponent, some jurisdictions completely eliminate 
the presumption from the case, 6 while in others it. may remain as a 
permissible inference for the jury.7 With these alternatives avail-
able, the Michigan Supreme Court decided both questions favorably 
to the contestant, holding, in accord with precedent,8 that the pre-
sumption arises on the minimum showing of a confidential relation-
ship, but, contrary to precedent,9 that credible rebutting evidence 
does not eliminate the presumption from the case.10 Thus, the result 
of the decision, which in effect shifts both the burden of going for-
ward with evidence and the risk of non-persuasion to the proponent-
beneficiary, 11 is that in Michigan the issue of undue influence must 
ing and scope of "confidential relations" differs widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
In C~nnecticut, the presumption arises only in specifically enumerated situations-
attorney-client, physician-patient, and priest-parishioner. Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, supra. 
The principal case, on the other hand, holds that confidential relations "exist when-
ever one man trusts in and relies upon another." Principal case at 282, 132 N.W.2d 
at 39. Accord, In the Matter of the Estate of Swan, supra. 
5. See, e.g., Cook v. Morton, 241 Ala. 188, 1 So. 2d 890 (1941); Jones v. National 
Bank of Commerce, 220 Ark. 665, 249 S.W .2d 105 (1952); Estate of Wright, 219 Cal. 
App. 2d 164, 33 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1963); Gehm v. Brown, 125 Colo. 555, 245 P.2d 865 
(1952); Zinnser v. Gregory, 77 So. 2d 611 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1955); Swaringen v. Swanstrom, 
67 Idaho 245, 175 P.2d 692 (1946); Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 361 Ill. 499, 198 N.E. 432 
(1935); Sweeney v. Vierbuchen, 224 Ind. 341, 66 N.E.2d 764 (1946); Olsen v. Corporation 
of New Melleray, 245 Iowa 407, 60 N.W.2d 832 (1953); Palmer v. Richardson, 311 Ky. 
190, 223 S.W.2d 745 (1949); Sellers v. Qualls, 206 Md. 58, 110 A.2d 73 (1954); Tarricone 
v. Cummings, 340 Mass. 758, 166 N.E.2d 737 (1960); Buckner v. Tuggle, 356 Mo. 718, 
203 S.W.2d 449 (1947); In the Matter of the Estate of Weeks, 29 N.J. Super. 533, 103 
A.2d 43 (App. Div. 1954); In re Estate of Day, 198 Ore. 518, 257 P.2d 609 (1953); Gold 
Will, 408 Pa. 41, 182 A.2d 707 (1962); Re Metz Estate, 78 S.D. 212, 100 N.W.2d 393 
(1960); Halle v. Summerfield, 199 Tenn. 445, 287 S.W.2d 57 (1956); In the Matter of 
the Estate of Nelson, 72 Wyo. 444, 266 P.2d 238 (1954). Compare Lake v. Seiffert, 410 
Ill. 444, 102 N.E.2d 294 (1951). 
6. See, e.g., In the Matter of the Estate of Weeks, supra note 5; Re Metz Estate, 
supra note 5; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 704(2) (1942). 
7. See, e.g., principal case; In the Matter of the Estate of Swan, 4 Utah 2d 277, 
293 P.2d 682 (1956); UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 14(b). 
8. See In re Hartlerode's Estate, 183 Mich. 51, 148 N.W. 774 (1914). The court 
dismissed the possibility that Hartlerode might represent the Connecticut view. See 
note 4 supra. But see Smith v. Cuddy, 96 Mich. 562, 56 N.W. 89 (1893). 
9. See In re Teller's Estate, 288 Mich. 193, 284 N.W. 696 (1939); In re Haskell's 
Estate, 283 Mich. 513,278 N.W. 668 (1938). 
10. Principal case at 297, 132 N.W.2d at 47. 
11. It is clear that the effect of the presumption in the principal case is to shift 
both the burden of producing evidence and the risk of non-persuasion. As to the 
former the court was explicit: "The immediate legal effect of a presumption is 
procedural-it shifts the burden of going forward with the evidence relating to the 
presumed fact." Principal case at 289, 132 N.W.2d at 43. However, the court dealt only 
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go to the jury in almost every case involving a beneficiary who was 
in a confidential relationship with testator, since a directed verdict 
for the proponent would be proper only when the presumption has 
been sufficiently rebutted that reasonable men could not differ.12 
According to the theory of presumptions adopted by the Michi-
gan Supreme Court in the principal case, the underlying reason for 
"almost" all presumptions is that they represent "the course of 
experience"-that is, experience establishes a factual probability 
that if certain basic facts are true, the presumed fact will very likely 
also be true.13 It is this factual probability which, according to the 
court, justifies retaining the presumption as a permissible inference 
for the jury. The existence of this factual probability with reference 
to any given presumption would seem to be discoverable by either 
of two lines of inquiry. The first approach is essentially a logical one 
which would require an examination of the basic fact situation-in 
this case, a substantial bequest to one in a confidential relationship 
-to determine whether or not the presumed fact-that the bequest 
was procured by undue influence-is a highly probable inference. 
The second approach is historical and requires an examination of 
the veracity of "the course of experience" as revealed in relevant 
precedent. Neither of these examinations was made in the principal 
case; rather, the requisite factual probability was assumed. The 
court's willingness to make this assumption without analysis is sub-
ject to question, for if it is not factually probable that undue in-
tangentially with the presumption's effect on the risk of non-persuasion. Nevertheless, 
it is equally clear from the court's discussion of jury instructions that the risk of non-
persuasion also shifts to the proponent: "[T]he jury should have been instructed • • • 
that in the event it could not decide upon which side the evidence for and against the 
presumed fact of undue influence preponderated, then as a matter of law it should 
find that undue influence had been proved." Principal case at 296-97, 132 N.W.2d at 
47. No explanation was given for this conclusion, and it does not follow from the fact 
that the presumption remains in the case as a permissible inference for the jury. 
Wigmore accepts the view that the jury may be told of the presumption as representing 
"the course of experience," see 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498a, at 341 (3d ed. 1940) 
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE], while emphatically rejecting the view that the risk of 
non-persuasion ever shifts. See 9 WIGMORE § 2489; cf. Laughlin, In Support of the 
Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REv. 195, 224 (1953). In the absence of 
any explanation, it must be assumed that the shifting of the risk of non-persuasion 
stems from the difficulties involved in telling the jury that it must weigh the presump-
tion against evidence, rather than from the court's general theory of presumptions. See 
Morgan, Further Observations On Presumptions, 16 So. CAL. L. REv. 245, 265 (1943): 
"To instruct a jury that a presumption is evidence or is to be weighed with or against 
evidence is to state a proposition without any definite meaning, a proposition which 
will convey only vague ideas to all of the jurors and perhaps positively erroneous 
notions to some of them." Morgan's solution was "to remind the jury that they must 
begin their consideration of the question as to the existence of the presumed fact with 
the assumption that it does exist." Id. at 264. This "working hypothesis" approach is 
also suggested by the Uniform rules. UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENCE 14, commissioners' 
note. 
12. Principal case at 291, 132 N.W.2d at 44. 
13. Id. at 288·89, 132 N.W.2d at42-43. 
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fluence is indicated merely by the fact that a gift is bequeathed to 
one in a confidential relationship with testator, then the rule artic-
ulated in the principal case imposes an unjustifiable burden on a 
significant number of testamentary beneficiaries and may unreason-
ably frustrate testator's intent. 
Had the court examined the basic factual situation to determine 
whether the presumed fact of undue influence was a highly probable 
inference, it would have found that the fact that a substantial bene-
fit has been bequeathed to one in a confidential relationship with 
testator is completely neutral; while it is~ertainly possible that the 
bequest was the result of the beneficiary's undue influence, it would 
seem equally possible that the gift reflected testator's voluntary 
desire to benefit a trusted advisor. Indeed, if one were to indulge in 
a "presumption against wrongdoing," the later possibility would 
seem the more probable of the two.14 However, even if undue in-
fluence is considered the more likely inference, such an inference 
would not seem to fulfill the court's requirement of "a strong 
practical likelihood."15 
If it were possible to support by "the course of experience" a 
presumption of undue influence when there is only a minimum 
showing of a confidential relationship, then the foregoing logical 
analysis would be irrelevant, since experience might show that 
apparent factual probabilities do not accurately reflect reality. How-
ever, since the court acknowledges that all presumptions are not 
factual probabilities derived from experience,16 an examination of 
the precedent supporting this particular presumption is necessary to 
determine whether such a presumption is, indeed, founded on fac-
tual probability. The court relies primarily on cases involving inter 
vivas, not testamentary, transfers.17 While the theory of presump-
tions operative in these cases is not clearly articulated, it would 
seem to be derived from the law's traditional suspicion of trans-
actions which are not at arm's length, rather than from a finding of 
a factual probability.18 Obviously this suspicion is based on experi-
14. See .Boardman v. Lorentzen, 155 Wis. 566, 145 N.W. 750 (1914). See also Goodbar 
v. Lidikey, 136 Ind. 1, 35 N.E. 691 (1893), holding that the confidential status of the 
beneficiary ought to increase the presumption in favor of the will. 
15. Principal case at 289, 132 N.W.2d at 42. 
16. Principal case at 288, 132 N.W.2d at 42. The court's assertion in the principal 
case that almost all presumptions are "crystallized inferences of fact" is open to some 
question. Ibid. Compare Morgan, supra note 11. 
17. Ross v. Conway, 92 Cal. 632, 28 Pac. 785 (1892); Van't Hof v. Jemison, 291 Mich. 
385, 289 N.W. 186 (1939). The Michigan cases involving testamentary dispositions are 
inconclusive on the issue of what basic facts give rise to the presumption of undue 
influence. See note 8 supra. As recently as 1939, the court found it unnecessary to 
decide whether or not the presumption arose on the mere showing of a confidential 
relationship, since it held that any presumption would have been rebutted by evidence 
of independent counsel. In re Teller's Estate, 288 Mich. 193, 284 N.W. 696 (1939). 
18. See Note, Undue Influence in Inter Vivas Transactions, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 707 
(1941). 
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ence, but the theory does not necessarily require that the suspicion 
rise to the level of probability; rather, the presumption has the 
effect of imposing on the inter vivas transferee in a confidential 
relationship the duty of justifying the transaction. The imposition 
of the duty can be ex.plained by two considerations, neither of which 
depends on the existence of a factual probability: first, policy ob-
jections to the effectuation of transfers obtained by undue influence, 
and second, the fact that since inter vivas transactions, are neces-
sarily face to face, the transferee will be in possession of the evidence 
necessary to rebut the presumption that he has acted improperly.19 
The personal confrontation is absent in the testamentary situation, 
unless there is additional evidence that the beneficiary procured the 
will or otherwise participated in its execution.20 Thus, the operation 
of the presumption in the inter vivas cases relied on by the court 
may be explained without reference to an experience-based prob-
ability. 
Even if the inter vivas presumption were based on experience, 
inter vivas cases would still be questionable authority for the prop-
osition that the presumption of undue influence in the testa-
mentary situation represented a factual probability. The majority 
of the courts have distinguished between these two situations and 
have accepted the rule that the presumption of undue influence 
arises on the showing of a confidential relationship in the inter 
vivas situation, whereas additional evidence is necessary to raise the 
presumption against the beneficiary of a testamentary disposition.21 
This requirement of additional evidence in the latter situation is 
logical, for the greater formality attending the execution of a will 
diminishes the opportunity for wrongdoing22 while providing a cau-
tionary force23 often absent in inter vivas transactions. Moreover, 
since the testamentary act is technically a unilateral act rather than 
a transaction, the beneficiary may be entirely ignorant of the 
bequest to him during the life of the testator.24 Finally, the inter 
vivas transfer of property to one in a confidential relationship seems 
inherently the more suspicious situation; people do not normally 
dispose of their property gratuitously during their lifetime, while, on 
the other hand, it is a normal occurrence for persons to dispose of 
19. "[H]e, who bargains in matter of advantage with a person placing confidence in 
him is bound to show, that a reasonable use has been made of that confidence." Gibson 
v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. Jun. 266,278, 31 Eng. Rep. 1044, 1050 (Ch. 1801). 
20, See PALMER&: WELLMAN, CASES ON TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION 609 (1960). 
21. The leading case making this distinction is Parfitt v. Lawless, L.R. 2 P. & D. 462 
(1872), often cited by American courts. See, e.g., Sellers v. Qualls, 206 Md. 58, 110 
A.2d 73 (1954). 
22, "[A] solemn testament executed under the formalities required by law" should 
not be invalidated unless it is affirmatively shown that testator's will was coerced. 
Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 922-23 (Tex. Sup. Ct.1963). 
23, Cf. Fuller, Consideration & Form, 41 CoLUM. L. REv. 799, 800 (1941). 
24, See note 20 supra and accompanying text. 
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their property gratuitously by testamentary devise-the only ques-
tionable aspect of such a gift to one in a confidential relationship 
is the selection of beneficiaries.25 For these reasons, the court's 
assumption in the principal case that experience establishes a strong 
probability that any bequest to one in a confidential relationship is 
procured by undue influence is open to serious doubts. 
Since an examination of both the factual situation and the prec-
edent fails to establish the probability of undue influence given 
merely a bequest to one in a confidential relationship with testator, 
the rule adopted in the principal case may well result in the sub-
mission of many contested wills to the jury on inadequate evidence. 
However, if the jury is allowed to speculate about testator's intent, 
the basic function of the Statute of Wills-providing certainty that 
if specified formalities are observed testamentary intent will be 
effectuated-will be greatly impaired. Under the rule of the princi-
pal case, there are apparently no precautions which, in the event of 
contest, will assure a directed verdict upholding a bequest to one in 
a confidential relationship.26 Moreover, the risk, delay, and expense 
inherent in any jury trial may force settlements which disregard 
what were, in fact, testator's freely expressed wishes. To the benefi-
ciary facing a will contest, the possibility of an adverse verdict may 
seem great regardless of the voluntariness of the will, since, in the 
absence of any convincing evidence, the jury might regard an 
"unnatural" will-one which is unfavorable to "the natural objects 
of testator's affection"-as an involuntary one.27 Finally, the primary 
purpose of the probate system is the speedy disposition of the estate 
in accordance with the will;28 any rule which encourages dilatory 
will contestants without increasing the likelihood of discovering 
testator's true intent leaves much to be desired. 
In light of these policy considerations and the doubtful nature of 
the assumed factual probability, it would seem that the holding in 
the principal case should be modified to the extent of requiring a 
greater evidentiary showing by the contestant before the presump-
tion is raised and the case sent to the jury. However, the question 
of what this additional showing ought to include is a difficult one. 
The most common additional requirement is evidence that the bene-
25. See Sellers v. Qualls, 206 Md. 58, 110 A.2d 73 (1954). 
26. One possibility might be to notify likely contestants at the time of execution 
and allow them to examine testator. However, this is highly un:r;ealistic since wills are 
often executed on very short notice and testators are not usually anxious to publicize 
the contents of them. See Cavers, Ante Mortem Probate: An Essay in Preventive Law, 
1 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 440 (1934). 
27. There is some confusion about the significance of the actual terms of the will 
as evidence of undue influence. It seems dear that the bequests actually made are 
indicative of undue influence only insofar as they deviate from testator's actual inten-
tions as established by evidence. See In the Matter of the Estate of Nelson, 72 Wyo. 
444, 266 P.2d 238 (1954). No a priori standard should be used to determine the natural• 
ness of the bequests. Compare Cook v. Morton, 241 Ala. 188, 1 So. 2d 890 (1941). 
28. See ATKINSON, WILlS § 93 (2d ed. 1953). 
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ficiary procured the will, but such a requirement might well be said 
to be too restrictive. Furthermore, such evidence is probably so 
similar to evidence which directly establishes undue influence as 
to render any presumption superfluous.29 Aside from this require-
ment, there is a wide range of circumstantial evidence which could 
be considered,30 although there is apparently no one factor which 
always accompanies the exercise of undue influence and which is 
always discoverable by the contestant.31 In response to this situation, 
at least one jurisdiction has adopted a flexible standard which seems 
to be a reasonable solution to a vexing problem. New Jersey re-
quires, in conjunction with proof of a confidential relationship, 
"additional circumstances of a suspicious character," in order to 
raise the presumption of undue influence.82 The "additional suspi-
cious circumstances" rule would supply the probability, which is 
lacking when only a confidential relationship is shown, that is neces-
sary to justify permitting the jury to decide the issue of undue in-
fluence. The obvious disadvantage of such a flexible rule is that it 
offers no concrete standards to the trial judge, and on appeal, the 
appellate court would be forced either to conduct what would 
amount to a de novo review,33 or to allow the trial court wide dis-
cretion.34 Undesirable as these alternatives might appear, they seem 
unavoidable in view of the problems created by the rule of the 
principal case. Moreover, since the "additional suspicious circum-
stances" rule insures the requisite factual probability, such a rule is 
within the Michigan Supreme Court's general theory that all pre-
sumptions should be based on the "course of experience." 
If additional protection against the possibility of undue influ-
29. Cf. King, Undue Influence in Wills in Illinois, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 457, 469 
(1935): "If a red-haired man writes or procures a will in which he is a substantial 
beneficiary, a presumption of undue influence arises. Obviously the fiduciary relation 
is as immaterial as the red hair. The Supreme Court of Illinois has in effect so held, 
but the words 'fiduciary relationship' still remain in the opinions and instructions to 
plague the courts and confuse the juries." 
30. See 3 PAGE, Wm:.c; § 29.78 (3d ed. Bowe & Parker 1961). 
31. "[I]t is not possible to say that any single circumstance or group of facts is the 
invariable mark of such a presumption [of undue influence], or that there is any uni-
form rule capable of application apart from the facts of each case." 9 WIGMORE § 2503, 
at 364-66. 
32. See In the Matter of the Will of Blake, 21 N.J. 50, 120 A.2d 745 (1956); In the 
Matter of the Will of Rittenhouse, 19 N.J. 376, 117 A.2d 401 (1955). 
33. Appellate courts often conduct extensive factual reviews on the issue of 
undue influence. See, e.g., In the Matter of the Estate of Nelson, 72 Wyo. 444, 266 P.2d 
238 (1954). 
34. Some extra latitude for the trial judge seems required by the very nature of the 
experience-based presumption. Clearly, where such a presumption is operative, artificial 
probative force is given to evidentiary facts A and B, in establishing the presumed 
fact C. This artificial force is justified as embodying the lesson of experience. However, 
if the relevant experience were the jury's, there would be no need for the artificial 
force, since the jury could be left to draw the proper inferences from facts A and B 
based on its own experience. Thus the very existence of the presumption indicates that 
the judge's experience is more important than the jury's. Cf. Morgan, Instructing the 
Jury upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARv. L. REv. 59, 74-77 (1933). 
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ence is necessary, it might be found outside the court's general 
theory. The need for a probative relationship between the basic 
facts and the presumed fact is created by the court's conclusion that 
the presumption must have the effect of carrying the case to the jury, 
despite the introduction of credible rebutting evidence. If the 
effect of the presumption were limited to the shifting of only the 
burden of producing evidence, and not the risk of non-persuasion,35 
then the need for a probative relationship between the basic facts 
and the presumed fact would be obviated. The minimal fact of a 
confidential relationship might legitimately give rise to a presump-
tion of law which shifts only the burden of producing evidence, even 
though the same facts could not justify a presumption of fact which 
shifts the risk of non-persuasion.36 Although the theories underlying 
these two types of presumptions are usually thought to be at odds 
with one another, there is no apparent reason why they could not 
operate in the altemative;37 nor would such an operation be un-
necessarily complicated in practice. If contestant produces evidence 
of a confidential relationship, thus raising a presumption of law, the 
effect of such a presumption would be to impose a duty of explana-
tion on the beneficiary.38 Once the explanation was introduced, the 
beneficiary would be entitled to a directed verdict, unless his dis-
closure was less than candid.39 The question of contestant's evidence 
of "additional suspicious circumstances" which would necessitate 
sending the case to the jury need not be decided until both sides 
have presented their evidence. Furthermore, the requisite "addi-
tional suspicious circumstances" might be drawn either from the 
35. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 704 (1942); Morgan, Further Observations on 
Presumptions, 16 So. CAL. L. REv. 245, 265 (1943). 
36. For a criticism of the distinction between presumptions of law and fact, see 
9 WIGMORE § 2491. 
37. Compare UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 14, which clearly adopts the view that 
there are two kinds of presumptions-with and without a basis in experience-which 
require separate treatment. 
The presumption of law, in the situation where only a confidential relationship 
has been introduced, serves the primary function of shifting the burden of producing 
evidence to the party who is likely to have unique knowledge of crucial facts. See 
9 WIGMORE § 2486, at 275. The beneficiary will always know if he has exercised undue 
influence. The difficulty is that he may not be able to ,prove it. Arguably, the utility of 
this type of presumption is diminished by modem discovery procedures. See Laughlin, 
supra note 11, at 220. However, it would have served an important function in the 
principal case, since the beneficiary, May Flemming, did not testify despite the efforts 
of contestant to subpeona her. Brief for Appellant, app. at 74a-75a. Compare In re 
Haskell's Estate, 283 Mich. 513, 518, 278 N.W. 668, 670 (1938) (dissenting opinion). 
38. For an analysis of the beneficiary's duty to explain, see In the Matter of the 
Will of Blake, 21 N.J. 50, 120 A.2d 745 (1956). 
39. Compare Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, I BUFFALO L. REv. I, 11 (1951). 
"The occasion calls for explanation ••• ·• If it appears that the defendant has not taken 
the pains to find out what lies in his power, or if he evades explanation at a crucial 
point, or if his evidence itself suggests mendacity, he has not destroyed the inference 
or the presumption and must submit to the jury or to a directed verdict." Jaffe was 
speaking of negligence law, but his analysis seems applicable to the proponent who 
must bear the burden of producing evidence in a wjll contest. 
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contestant's proofs or from the inadequacy of the proponent's re-
buttal.40 
The Michigan Supreme Court's decision in the principal case is 
the result of an attempt to incorporate the operation of the pre-
sumption of undue influence within the court's general theory of 
presumptions, not an examination of the specific requirements of 
the law of wills. The court did not consider the special problems 
presented by the fact situation of a bequest to one in a confidential 
relationship, the solutions adopted by courts in other jurisdictions, 
nor the practical impact of its treatment of the presumption. It may 
be hoped that the holding of the principal case will be modified in 
light of these factors. While a uniform rule of presumptions might 
be desirable, the natural inclination of people to favor those dose to 
them in old age ought not be sacrificed to the requirements of legal 
symmetry. 
40. Another possible modification is the adoption of the Connecticut rule that the 
presumption does not arise when the beneficiary in a confidential relationship is a "nat-
ural object of testator's affection." Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 147 Conn. 474, 162 A.2d 709 
(1960); see 40 NoTRE DAME I.Aw. 676, 680 (1965). However, it would seem that relative-
beneficiaries are as capable of exercising undue influence as are strangers. If the basic 
facts, which give rise to the presumption, generate the requisite probability, then the 
case should go to the jury. 
